Conduct in Narrativized Trust Games by Osborn, Jan et al.
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
English Faculty Articles and Research English
1-2015
Conduct in Narrativized Trust Games
Jan Osborn
Chapman University, josborn@chapman.edu
Bart J. Wilson
Chapman University, bjwilson@chapman.edu
Bradley R. Sherwood
Chapman University, sherw106@mail.chapman.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/english_articles
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, and the Social Psychology and Interaction Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the English at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
English Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Osborn, Jan, Bart J. Wilson, and Bradley R. Sherwood. “Conduct in Narrativized Trust Games.” Southern Economic Journal 81.3
( January 2015): 562-597.
DOI: 10.4284/0038-4038-2013.292
Conduct in Narrativized Trust Games
Comments
This article was originally published in Southern Economic Journal, volume 81, issue 3, in 2015. DOI: 10.4284/
0038-4038-2013.292
Copyright
Southern Economic Association
This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/english_articles/47
Conduct in Narrativized Trust Games
Jan Osborn, Bart J. Wilson,† and Bradley R. Sherwood‡
We “narrativize” a basic extensive form trust game by placing participants in a story that
contextualizes the interaction with an unforeseeable future. In our narrative experiment,
participants consider each decision as a character, advancing the story with their choices for
salient payoffs. Our interest is in understanding how participants apply Adam Smiths rules of
beneficent and just conduct in our narrativized games with epistemic conditions of an
unknown future, conditions which arent possible in extensive form. We invite our readers to
participate in the story of the results, making meaning as participants in a narrative that
unfolds with their choices.
JEL Classification: B12, C90, D03
Man has developed rules of conduct not because he knows but because he does not know what all the con-
sequences of a particular action will be.
–F.A. Hayek
1. Introduction
An incessant buzz emanates from your pocket, interrupting your otherwise peaceful post-
lecture lunch. You put your sandwich down and pull out your phone to see what the big deal is.
“Ohyeah,” you remember as you read the reminder, “I have one of those experiments today.” You
head over to the laboratory a little early, recalling that there is an “on-time bonus” for being punc-
tual. After entering the building, you follow the signs to the lobby and take a seat in the sea of
strangers all here for the same reason: to get paid in cash for doing an experiment. You scan the
room and recognize a face or two, but for the most part, you know no one. The two people next to
you seem to know each other, but they are hushed by the lab attendant almost immediately after
they begin talking. Rolling their eyes, they switch their attention to their phones. You sit in silence
for another minute or two before you see a line start to form in front of the attendant. You join the
line, get your ID card scanned, and follow another monitor into the laboratory.
Shuffling into a room linedwith computers in cubicles, you are directed to a computer terminal
and get settled. “Wonderwhat this experiment is,” you ponder, recalling the last time you participated.
“Some sort of auction last time. It tookmeawhile to catchonbut Imade like twentybucks.”Youbegin
to scan the instructions, readingabouthowyouandanotherpersonwillmake joint decisions in agame
tree thatwill determine your final payouts. It is only a few clicks through the simple instructions before
youare toldyouare the firstmover (while theotherparticipantwaits)andtheexperimentbegins.
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A diagram appears on your screen, a series of orange and blue circles, flashing arrows, and
pairs of payouts in dollars (see Figure 1). “Wait,” you think as youwork your way through the tree
of decisions and consequences on display in front of you. “This is it? So if I first click the down arrow,
the other person can click right and give me $18 and himself $30. Not bad. Better than the $12 we
each get if I just click right. But will he click down instead, going for the $42? Then Im choosing
between $6 or $4. That would suck. I hope it doesnt come to that. So, will he or wont he? Or is he
a she?Hes going to seeme click down and that I could click down again. Butwill I click down again?
Maybe I should just end it, take my $12, and be done with it. No, he knowswhy Id first click down.
I see 18 instead of 12 dollars. He got the good seat. Id take the $30 if I were him. But is he thinking
likeme?” You take amoment. Click. The experiment ends, you collect your money and leave.
* * *
Many economists will recognize the extensive form game (EFG) above as a variant of a trust
game (see Camerer 2003 and Smith 2008 for a summaryof trust games). At the initial decision node,
the first mover decides whether or not to trust the second mover to play right against her pecuniary
interest of playing down, because playing down a second time is not in the monetary interest of the
first mover. The primary question for the first mover boils down to whether the second mover is
trustworthy. In this version of the trust game, the second mover also questions whether the first
mover is spiteful, that is, willing at a personal cost of $2 to punish her for not choosing ($18, $30).
As a first approximation for understanding these human concepts of trust, trustworthiness,
and spite, economists begin with the assumption that agents have complete symmetric information
over all contingencies, which lends itself to tidy logic and, hence, full explanations. The everyday use
of these concepts, however, is not limited to the concrete circumstances of this provisional assump-
tion. We also trust someone not just when we know what the payoffs may be but as a general rule.
That is what we mean when we say that we trust someone with our life. Likewise, we say that
Figure 1. Game Tree. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.
com.]
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someone is trustworthy, not only because he did not take advantage of us on a specific occasion, but
because it is inhis character tobe trustworthy inunforeseeable circumstances, comewhatmay.Often
that is why we trusted him in the first place. But how is it that someone personally unknown to us
comes tobe trustworthy for the very first time? It depends on the circumstances of time and place. It
dependsonhis character. It dependson the story that leadsup to the encounter.Ordoes it?
2. Narrative and Human Conduct
Telling Stories
Even in theworldofEFGs, aworldwherebackward inductionapplies,where all possiblepayoffs
areknown, there are stories like those captured in the internalmonologof theopening, anassumption
that the other person is also involved in a narrative:No, he knows why Id click down first. Does he? So,
will he orwont he? Is he thinkinglikeme?Or is he a she?People try to imaginewhat story the other par-
ticipant is telling as they lookat thedecision tree, but the causal structure is known inadvance,with all
possible outcomes and payoffs included. This study makes explicit the implied storytelling in an
experiment that takes the basic structure of an EFG and narrativizes the decisions in an unfolding
story,providinganarrative inwhich theplayersparticipatewithout recourse tobackward induction.
So much of human conduct depends on narrative, on how we situate ourselveswithin the cir-
cumstances, within the story of our lives. Barthes (1975) explores the importance of narrative in
the human experience, noting its ubiquity and variety of forms: “present at all times, in all places,
in all societies. . .Like life itself, it is there, international, transhistorical, transcultural” (p. 237).
Didion (2006) also situates the importance of narrative. “We tell ourselves stories,” she writes, “in
order to live” (p. 185). But it is Didions explanation of the meaning-making choices inherent in
human storytelling that is pertinent for our purposes (p. 185):
We interpret what we see, select the most workable of the multiple choices. We live entirely. . .by
the imposition of the narrative line upon disparate images, by the “ideas” with we have learned
to freeze the shifting phantasmagoria which is our actual experience.
We interpret what we see, this interpretation becoming a narrative; we tell ourselves to make
sense of our experiences.
Currie (2007), working with narrative and representation, establishes a causal link between story
and our actual experiences, explaining an internal and external dimension to narrative, fictional or
nonfictional. A narrative—whether one we tell ourselves or one we interact with as an audience—has
both the internal aspect, which establishes the content of the narratives representation, the characters,
their actions, and so forth, and the “causal relatedness. . . of its events” (p. 50), a things-will-work-this-
way-in-the-world-of-the-story; and the external aspect, which initiates our “judgements of proba-
bility” (p. 50), evoking factors external to the world established in the story. “The causal richness that
the narrative form demands,” Currie argues, “cannot all be provided explicitly, and must depend on
massive imports from the real world” (p. 51). To create or consume stories, we must “import . . .
assumptions about causation we make concerning the real world” (Currie, p. 54), factors not made
explicit in the narrative. Currie refers to this as “external dependence” (p. 56), our assumptions about
the world of the story based on how we believe the worldworks. In an EFG, these assumptions about
causation are payoff, path-dependent assumptions, the story contained in a sterile frame of known
results. In naturally occurring contexts, the “payoff” is often not revealed in this way. The narrative is
open-ended, calling onmuchmore “massive imports from the realworld.”
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Barthes (1975) refers to the causal element of narrative as a “syntax of human behavior” (p.
252), tracing the “succession of choices which this or that character inevitably has to face at vari-
ous points in the story, and thus, to bring to light what could be called an energetic logic,” a deci-
sion to do this or to do that (p. 252). It is the narrative we create that helps us negotiate the
succession of choices in our lives. The “ifs,” the “maybes”—even in an EFG experiment—involve
a story we are telling ourselves. Our study shifts the decisions from a payoff perspective to a narra-
tive perspective to explore Adam Smiths rules of beneficent and just conduct (1759). By narrativ-
izing the decisions, we dispense with the simplifying assumption of complete knowledge on the
precise consequences of every action and embed the choices in a more human context, a context
of story in which nobody knowswhat all the consequences of a particular action will be.
Internal Narrative and Adam Smiths Rules of Conduct
In a rather intriguing precursor to Barthes, Didion, and Currie, Adam Smith (The Theory of
Moral Sentiments 1759) invokes the importance of a form of narrative and a syntax of human con-
duct. Smith theorizes that moral judgment is based on sympathy, on a human beings ability to share
feelingswith other human beings. He explains that our imagination is central to this process (p. 9):
As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the man-
ner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like sit-
uation. . .By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation. . .
This is a kind of “external dependence” (Currie 2007, p. 56). Our assumptions about the
experience of another based on our senses, our own experiences creating the narrative we tell our-
selves to sympathize with another. This “imposition of the narrative line” (Didion 2006, p. 185) is
central to Smiths theory of moral sentiments. “Fellow-feeling,” as he calls it, involves narrativiz-
ing the situation at hand. Although not using the word “narrative,” Smith is suggesting that our
imagination evokes a pleasure or pain felt instantaneously when we imagine the story of the other.
Smith then builds on this idea to explain how we judge the merit or demerit of anothers
actions, arguing that when we imagine ourselves in the situation we make moral judgments. When
the passions of the person involved are “in concord with the sympathetic emotions of the
spectator” (Smith 1759, p. 16), we judge the actions as deserving reward. Whereas, when the pas-
sions of the person involved are not in concord with what we feel, they deserve punishment. It is
the story we are telling ourselves about the situation that elicits the judgment. We impose our own
narrative line onto the actions in question by achieving “some correspondence of sentiments
between the spectator and the person principally concerned” (p. 21).
Once he has established this connection between the actor and the spectator, Smith connects
this sense of merit and demerit to the concepts of reward and punishment. Smith posits that the
judgment ofmerit or demerit depends on both the situation and the consequent action and that, as a
result, reward or punishment depends on the beneficial or hurtful effects and the sentiments associ-
ated with the action. He argues that the sentiment most directly prompting reward is gratitude and
that the sentimentmost directly prompting punishment is resentment (Smith 1759, p. 68). Beneficent
action, which comes from“proper” motives, results in the sentiment of gratitude, prompting reward;
hurtful action, which comes from “improper” motives, results in the sentiment of resentment,
prompting punishment. This “syntax of human behavior” (Barthes 1975) in a Smithian framework
impacts the narrative, the storywe tell ourselves in deciding on beneficence (Smith 1759, p. 95):
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What gratitude chiefly desires, is not only to make the benefactor feel pleasure in his turn, but
to make him conscious that he meets with this reward on account of his past conduct, to make
him pleased with that conduct, and to satisfy him that the person upon whom he bestowed his
good offices, was not unworthy of them. . .We are delighted to find a person who values us as
we value ourselves. . .
On the other side of this syntax is resentment, resulting in punishment: “What chiefly enrages
us against the man who injures or insults us, is the little account which he seems to make of us, the
unreasonable preference which he gives to himself above us” (p. 96). In making these determina-
tions, we are evoking a story, imagining why the other chose to do this or that, basing our interpre-
tation on the narrative we have created. Such narrativizing of our lives is central to any gratitude/
reward, resentment/punishment scenario.
Narrative in Games
Dickey (2006) explains the link between narrative and problem solving in games, first connect-
ing narrative to solving problems in general—“It is through narrative constructs that we frame and
recount daily experiences in problem solving” (p. 245)—and then specifically exploring the use of
narrative in adventure games, concluding, “Game designers are well versed in devices and techni-
ques for constructing compelling and engaging narratives that allow for immersion and agency”
(p. 245). Simon (2007) extends the importance of narrative to game theory, arguing that narratives
“provide excellent platforms for thought experiments and simulations of models of behavior” (Par
18). When Simon quotes Edward Branigan (2006, Projecting a Camera: Language Games in Film
Theory), the problem-solving, meaning-making, human circle is complete (as quoted in Par 19):
One of the purposes of seeing and perceiving narratively is to weigh how certain effects that are
desired may be achieved, how desire is linked to possibilities for being, how events may pro-
ceed. In this way, perceiving narratively operates to draw the future into desires expressed in
the present as well as demonstrates how the present was caused by the past and how the present
may have effects in the future.
The importance of “perceiving narratively. . .to draw the future into desires expressed in the pre-
sent” provides a framework for our narrativizing an EFG, a moving from a path-dependent payoff
to a story where the paths unfold as the characters make choices. The story we are telling ourselves
impacts conduct.
The environment established by the narrative in adventure games helps players make deci-
sions and is an important element in role-playing games (RPGs) either table top or electronic,
such as Dungeons & Dragons or Final Fantasy. Through a narrative story line, players “identify
and construct causal patterns that integrate what is known . . . with that which is conjectural yet
plausible within the context of the story” (Dickey 2006, p. 252).
There is also a form of RPGs made popular as a young adult book series: Choose Your Own
Adventure. R. A. Montgomery, with roots in the design of interactive RPGs in the early 1970s,
published an RPG in book form.1 The genre allows the reader to imagine she is a character in the
adventure and to make choices that impact the outcome of the story. The readers choice, with-
out any idea where it may lead, determines the path of the narrative. If the reader chooses one
1 “History of Choose Your Own Adventure.” <http://www.cyoa.com/pages/history-of-cyoa>. Accessed January 18,
2013.
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scenario, she is directed to a specific page; for example, “Turn to page 15.” If she chooses a
different scenario, she is directed to a different page, the adventure determined by the reader
imagining what would happen. This unfolding of the narrative is central to the design of our
study.
—But what is the relevance of the above senses of a “game” to the economists formal defini-
tion and use of a “game” in game theory? Are we not conflating the use of the word?—The com-
mon family resemblance of all senses of a game is this: People do not merely do a game; we play a
game. And to play a game is to engage our imagination, to engage in a narrative governed by rules,
whether it be the Green Bay Packers driving the football down the field, a lone teenager rescuing a
princess in Kings Quest, or a Walmart and a Target executive each privately setting their weekly
prices for a three-packof Haneswhite t-shirts. Playing a game entails (i) imagining, via a narrative,
what the future may hold and (ii) acting in accordance with the rules of the narrative, both formal
and informal.
Game theory strips the “narrative” down to outcomes, which are “non-negotiable”
(Simon, Par 25), and a causal structure of actions, which are known in advance (in normal or
extensive form). Players in this game use strategies based on immediate or anticipated future
benefit. In a head-to-head, zero sum interaction, reducing the problem to this “essence”
predicts reasonably well, for the actions and consequent payoffs dominate the content of the
narrative.2 But in a positive sum world with the possibilities for trust, the narratives imposed by
the mind are too rich to be distilled down to players, actions, and a mapping of actions into pay-
offs. Our human minds rely on rules of conduct to cope with these fickle circumstances, particu-
larly when the precise consequences of our actions are unknown.
It is at the point between a non-negotiable, backward induction structure and a negotiable,
narrative context for decision-making where this study begins. We compare how people conduct
themselves in a sterile EFG environment to how they conduct themselves when they are, instead,
acting as a participant in a narrative, making decisions as a character in a story. To explore this
juncture, we create a narrative context for an extensive form trust game in Smith and Wilson
(2013). They design several EFGs, one of which is central to our experiment, to test three of Adam
Smiths propositions of moral conduct. Specifically, we construct our narrative to investigate two
rules of conduct from the section entitled “Of Justice and Beneficence” in Part II entitled “Of
Merit andDemerit” (p. 78):
Rule of Beneficent Conduct: “Actions of a beneficent tendency, which proceed from proper
motives, seem alone to require reward; because such alone are the approved objects of grati-
tude, or excite the sympathetic gratitude of the spectator.”
Rule of Just Conduct: “Actions of a hurtful tendency, which proceed from improper motives,
seem alone to deserve punishment; because such alone are the approved objects of resentment,
or excite the sympathetic resentment of the spectator.”
With slightly different payoffs, Smith andWilson (2013) replicate three other experiments on
one-shot extensive form trust games (McCabe and Smith 2000, Cox and Deck 2005, and Gillies
and Rigdon 2008). Approximately half of the first movers beneficently play down in both versions
of the game in Figure 2, and two-thirds of the second movers reward those actions of a beneficent
tendency by playing right. Thus, roughly one-third of the pairs achieve the ($18, $30) or ($15, $25)
2 Vernon Smith (personal communication, 11 August 2013).
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outcome as compared to approximately half of the pairs realizing the Pareto-dominated ($12,
$12) or ($10, $10) outcome predicted by moneymaximization and subgame perfection.
To test the Rule of Just Conduct, Smith and Wilson add a third decision node to Figure 2 if
the second mover plays down. At the third decision node (see Figure 3), the first mover can either
play right yielding payoffs of ($6, $42) or play down yielding payoffs of ($4, $4). Only 7 of 25 first
movers reach the third node and just 3 of them (42.9%) resent the secondmovers enough to punish
them.We create a narrative for Figures 1 and 3 in which the readers as participants make decisions
that further the plot. We then compare how our participants conduct themselves as compared to
participants in traditional extensive form trust game experiments.
Figure 2. Trust Games with No Punishment. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available
at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 3. Trust Game with Punishment. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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3. Experimental Design and Procedures
Unlike an EFG in which participants see all potential outcomes and the paths to those out-
comes, our narrative reveals only one decision node at a time, thus eliminating the opportunity for
backward induction. The participants become characters in the world of a story that unfolds in
front of them. When characters make a decision, they do not know that it may end the game or
pass the next decision to the other character. All they know is that they are furthering the story as
the three short pages of simple instructions inform them:
Welcome (page 1)
Today you will participate as a character in a story. The story will unfold as two characters
make decisions. The decisions made by you and another person seated in this laboratory will
determine how much money you will earn. Your earnings will be paid to you privately, in cash,
at the end of your story.
The Story (page 2)
You and the other character will jointly determine the plot, resulting in a set of payoffs. When
it is time to make a decision, two buttons will appear, each designating an action to take in the
story.
At the end of the story, you will be paid at the rate of US$1 per 1,000 story dollars. For exam-
ple, if you end with $9,000 in the context of the story, you will be paid US$9.
Your story may conclude before or after participants around you. When your story comes to
an end, please wait quietly until you are called to the window to be paid.
Ready to Begin (page 3)
If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and a monitor will come by to answer them.
If you are finished with the instructions, please click the START button. The instructions will
remain on your screen until everyone has clicked the START button. We need everyone to click
the START button before the story can begin.
The Design of the Story
In an EFG experiment, two strangers without a personal history interact in what they may or
may not contextualize as a personal, social interaction. The first decision in narrativizing the
game is choosing the setting for the story. We deliberated between either setting the scene as an
interaction between explicit strangers or between two characters personally known to each other.
Supposing that characters known to each other might be more likely to reach the ($18, $30) out-
come than in EFG experiments, we set the scene with two characters who have a history with each
other. Failing to observe more ($18, $30) outcomes in this context would be that much more
informative.
We then place these two characters familiar with each other in a plotline that is readily relat-
able to undergraduate participants and ask the first mover to take one of two actions, one of which
ends the story with the ($12, $12) outcome and the other which passes the decision-making to the
other character. We do not assign a name to the participant reading the story; he or she is simply
referred to as “you.” Each participants counterpart, however, is referred to as “Taylor,” a name
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without gender specification. Figure 4 displays the story for the first decision node. The first mov-
ers perspective is on the left and the secondmovers on the right.
Unlike in an EFG where it is basically up to the participants whether to travel the tree
with a notion of “were in this together” or “Im in this for myself,” we embed the two charac-
ters as coworkers in a collaborative relationship. To further emphasize the collaboration, the
two characters jointly develop an app on their own time outside of work. Each character par-
ticipates equally in the development of the app, and each is responsible for a specific portion of
the app. Thus, it is a joint effort that generates the total value of the app. Note that we purpose-
fully state that the value of the app could possibly increase without providing any monetary
specifics. In contrast to an EFG, the story only hints at the possibility of a better offer for the
app. The characters must discover on the fly the total value of the app. In the EFG, it is public
knowledge that the first mover may end up with a lower payoff by not initially ending the
game. Thus, without being aware of such a possibility, we hypothesize that a greater propor-
tion of first movers will “let Taylor take the app to the convention” than first movers play
down in the extensive form trust game.
Action buttons, which always begin with averb, express the characters agency in the context
of the story, much like the option to flip between pages in the Choose Your Own Adventure Series.
For each pair of participants, the computer randomly determines the order in which the options to
act are presented to the pair. The first (second) option is always presented as the left (right) button
and we block the color of the left button, blue or orange, across all pairs. The character who does
not have a decision to make must click on the green “Ready to Go On” button. Only after both
participants have clicked a button does the story simultaneously advance for the pair.
We narrativize the two options of the second mover by having another company double the
initial offer. The decision for the second mover is how to allocate who receives what portion of the
new offer (see Figure 5). The participants can always click back to reread how they arrived at sub-
sequent decision nodes.
Figure 4. Narrative of First Movers Decision Node. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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Notice that at this decision node, the paths and payoff outcomes are exactly the same as
in the extensive form trust game without punishment (Figure 2). The first mover has foregone
($12, $12) and the second mover is deciding between ($18, $30) and ($6, $42). Smith and Wil-
son (2013) interpret the ($18, $30) outcome as rewarding the beneficence of the first mover
because the second movers payoff increases from $12 to either $30 or $42. But does the second
mover recognize the first movers act as one of beneficence? In our story, we complicate the
recognition of beneficence by explicitly stating that the new offer is due to the second movers
distinct portion of the joint effort. Thus, our narrative, unlike an austere EFG, justifies why
the second mover receives more money in the ($18, $30) outcome that rewards beneficence.
But does it justify ($6, $42)? At this point in the extensive form trust game without punish-
ment, both participants know that this decision is final. In contrast, in the extensive form trust
game with punishment (Figure 3), both know that the first mover will have to sanction ($6,
$42) by foregoing ($4, $4) at the next decision node. In the narrative, though, both participants
know only that the second mover is choosing between ($18, $30) and ($6, $42) and that the
story may or may not end with either decision. Does a rule of beneficent conduct apply for the
second mover?
This is a realistic middle ground case that an EFG cannot readily accommodate. Sure, we
could create a new unformalizable EFG experiment in which the second mover clicks on the ($6,
$42) outcome and then a new decision node for the first mover suddenly appears in its stead.
Oops, you thought you had clicked on ($6, $42) but, no, now the first mover decides. But how would
we explain how the decision-making in the game tree works without deceiving the participants?
Even supposing that we could find such delicate but not contorted statements to explain the story-
free exercise, the subjects are going to be asking themselves, why and what (the heck) is going on?
There is nothing for the participant to cleave to. In a narrative, we can preempt questions stem-
ming from vertigo, thereby allowing the participants to focus on the decision of interest. The story
grounds the participants. It is a basis on which to predicate their thinking. (Recall the inner mono-
log in the opening narrative.)
Figure 5. Narrative of Second Movers Decision Node. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which
is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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If the second mover chooses ($18, $30), the characters receive a one sentence ending to the
story (see Figure 6). Again the order of the two outcomes is randomly presented to the pair and
the colors of the button blocked across half of the pairs.
If the second mover chooses ($6, $42), the story continues, and the first mover has another
decision to make (see Figure 7). The key principle for the narrative design at this juncture in the
story is to present a plausibly unforeseeable opportunity for the first mover to punish the second
mover for not choosing ($18, $30). Notice that their employer has come forward in the meantime
and is willing to represent the first mover. Taking the second mover to court is a deliberate and
Figure 6. Story Ending for the ($18, $30) Outcome. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 7. Narrative of First Mover at the Third Decision Node. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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explicitly meaningful action for carrying out resentment. The costs of suing andwinning justify to
the characters a loss of $40. As with the previous decision nodes, the order of the two actions is
randomly presented to the pair and the colors of the button blocked across half of the pairs.
The outcomes of this decision node and the path to it are the same as those in the third and
final decision node of the extensive form trust game with punishment. Smith and Wilson (2013)
predict, based on Adam Smiths Rule of Just Conduct, that because the second mover is harming
the first mover (giving a payoff less than $18 or $12) the secondmover deserves punishment by the
first mover. Smith and Wilson (2013), however, find that only 3 out of 7 first movers (42.9%)
choose ($4, $4).
Their ex post facto speculation is that both participants know, even before the first mover
plays down, that the second mover can also play down. Thus, when the decision reaches the sec-
ond mover, she may be daring the first mover to choose ($4, $4). In other words, the second mover
is not harming the first mover because the first mover knows from the get-go that the second
mover may play down. In our narrative, this is not the case. The first mover does not know that
the second mover will be presented with a choice to harm the first mover, and the second mover
does not know that the first mover will have the opportunity to punish the secondmover after hav-
ing explicitly chosen ($6, $42). Notice also that in the EFGwith punishment, the secondmover lit-
erally chooses a branch in the tree, but in the narrative the second mover actually chooses a
contract paying out ($6, $42). The question is, in the heat of the moment, will a greater proportion
of first movers in the narrative resent a perceived harm and punish the second movers by choosing
($4, $4) over ($6, $42) than in the extensive form trust game with punishment? Obviously, there is
a key difference that the story may go on and the EFGwill not, but that difference is part and par-
cel of what we are exploring. Does a rule of just conduct apply for the first mover?
If the first mover takes Taylor to court, the first (second) mover reads the following conclu-
sion to the story: “You (Taylor) sued Taylor (you). MobileSpace owns the app and you have
received a check in the amount of $4,000. The End.” And if the first mover accepts the contract,
the story similarly ends this way: “You accepted the contract and have received a check in the
amount of $6,000. The End.” Correspondingly, the story concludes for the second mover with
“Taylor accepted the contract, and you have received a check in the amount of $42,000. The
End.”
Before presenting our results in the next section, we anticipate hesitancies to engaging our
project. Some readers may fear that by choosing a concrete narrative our findings are likely to be
specific to this story and, thus, provide little insight, in general, into rules of conduct. This fear of
that which appears to be less general is rooted in the fallacy that the particular case is somehow
incomplete. The fact is, however, that “abstract rules of conduct determine particular actions only
together with particular circumstances (Hayek 1973, pp. 105–6, emphasis added). That is how the
mind works. In theorizing, we abstract from the totality of facts precisely because we cannot han-
dle all the facts. Thus, the best we can hope to do as social scientists is to trace out the lower-
dimensional projections of these super-conscious abstract rules of conduct (Wilson 2008).
Our project also runs counter to the tradition of administering detailed instructions, often
accompanied with a quiz, to “ensure” that the participants “understand” the problem before
them. As Vernon Smith points out, “this comes dangerously close to just trying to be sure that the
[subjects] understand what the theorist-experimenter understands by the game—imposing our
own narratives which implicitly assumes that is the right way to think about the games” (personal
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communication, 11 August 2013).3 In contrast, we define the relationship between the participants
via an explicit narrative, but make the outcomes open-ended so as to understand the decisions
from the perspective of the participants.
Procedures
For a series of four equally sized sessions, we recruited 96 undergraduate participants, 50
male and 46 female, at Chapman University to participate in a one-hour experiment in the spring
of 2013. For 16.7% of the participants, this was their first economic experiment, and the median
number of experiments of prior experience was 4. Each subject received $7 for showing up on time
andwas seated in a computer laboratory with 24 visually isolated carrels. The participants read at
their own pace the three pages of instructions reported above. All 12 pairs in a session began read-
ing the story at the same time. The participants were privately paid their earnings plus their show-
up payment after the last pair concluded their story. From the initial seating to the payment of the
last participant, the experiment lasted approximately 30minutes.
4. Results
We compare the participants organic decisions growing out of the story with those from tra-
ditional EFG experiments in which the participants have nothing to cleave to except the bare
structure of the game.4 Figure 8 reports the results for the first decision in our narrative.
Finding: A smaller proportion of first movers choose ($12, $12) in our narrative experiment than
they do in an extensive form trust game experiment.
Smith and Wilson (2013) find that their proportion of first movers who play right is statisti-
cally insignificant when compared to the three prior trust game experiments with slightly different
payoffs (McCabe and Smith 2000; Cox and Deck 2005; Gillies and Rigdon 2008). Forming one
metadata set from all four experiments, 74 of 147 first movers (50.3%) end the game in extensive
form trust game experiments. We find that only 11 of 48 first movers (22.9%) choose to “Sell the
app toMobileSpace,” ending the game. Using a one-sided two-proportion z-test, we reject the null
Figure 8. Narrative Results for First Decision. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is avail-
able at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
3 See also Smith (2002).
4 We are not simply changing two articulable procedures in going from a traditional EFG design to our narrative design.
We might be tempted to identify change 1 as “an unforeseeable future” and change 2 as a “the narrative.” Because the
future, foreseeable or not, and an explicit narrative, present or not, are each of different epistemological kinds, we can-
not articulate all the differences internal to the mind of the participants in moving from one to the other. In a deep
sense then, we are not simply making two changes. We are making uncountable changes of interest.
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hypothesis of equal proportions (z5 3.3, p-value5 0.0004). As hypothesized, knowing that there
is a possibility of greater joint value and without explicitly knowing that they could do worse than
$12, more first movers take the leap and let the second mover take the next action in our experi-
ment. The narrative has established a relationship at this node, the two characters living within a
world of shared participation in the development of the app, thus, furthering the trust, even in a
situation where potential outcomes are unknown.
On seeing the remaining results of our experiment it is tempting to claim, “Of course, it had
to happen like that. Whereas we ought to think: it may have happened like that – and also in
many other ways” (Wittgenstein 1980, p. 37e). So in what follows we take the rather unconven-
tional approach of using the readers predictions about what our subjects do to synthesize the con-
clusions of the experiment. In other words, the readers choose their own adventure through our
results, culminating in one of eight possible lessons learned from the experiment.
What do we learn from our experiment by presenting the results this way? If at this moment
you cannot predict what you will learn from this experiment because you do not even know what
outcomes are possible (why are eight possible?) nor the actions you will have to take to realize
them, then the focal question becomes, what story are you telling yourself to pick the next page to
turn to? How do you make the decision that you do with an unforeseeable future? How are you
thinking about Adam Smiths rules of conduct? Not only will we learn from this experiment how
Adam Smiths rules of beneficent and just conduct work or dont work for our participants, we
will learn how to invert the very way we think about games in economics; that is, we are learning
how Adam Smith would think about games. In this article, we begin with the process of thinking
and feeling in narrative to which we then consider which rules of conduct apply. At this point, the
reader who dwells on the actual results misses the point of the article and our presentation of it:
What are the abstract rules of conduct for the narrative by which the participants in our experi-
ment act with an unforeseeable future, and what are the abstract rules for the narrative by which
the reader of economic science thinks about rules of conduct?
If the reader is with us and open to a new way of thinking about games and simultaneously
analyzing and synthesizing an experiment, we recommend printing out the article if you havent
already done so. As readers of Choose Your Own Adventure books may recall, part of the experi-
ence is tactile, and fingering through the text is much easier (and more fun) with a physical copy
than a digital one. On reaching the conclusion, we also invite the reader to return to this page and
rereadwith at least one alternative path.
In the EFGs of Figure 2, both participants know the possibilities before the first mover either
ends the game or sends the choice to the secondmover. In the narrative, however, the characters only
know that the options are selling the app in-house and taking ($12, $12) or letting the second mover
take the app to the tech convention; they do not know that taking ($12, $12) will end the experiment,
nor do they know what lies ahead should the first mover choose to “forgo selling the app.” The sec-
ond mover does know that when the decision is passed to her, the first mover has no knowledge of a
specific higher payoff. She only knows that the first mover knows of a possible higher payoff (see
Figure 4). Thus, narrative participants arriving at the second decision node are getting there for dif-
ferent reasons and under different epistemic conditions than EFG participants even though the pay-
off options for the secondmover are identical to those in the EFG.
If you think that 17 of the 37 second movers (45.9%) choose the ($18, $30) contract, go to page
576.
If you think that 27 of the 37 secondmovers (73.0%) choose the ($18, $30) contract, go to page 579.
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Figure 9a summarizes the number of decisions through the first two nodes. Even though we
observe in Finding 1 that a greater proportion of first movers let the second mover take the next
action than in an EFG, a smaller proportion of second movers, 45.9%, choose ($18, $30). In EFG
experiments (Figure 2), 67.1% of second movers play right (49 out of 73). Using a two-sided two-
proportion z-test, we reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z 5 2.1, p-value 5 0.0322).
The net result is that nearly the same proportion of narrative and EFG pairs, 35.4% and 33.3%
(49 out of 147), respectively, achieve a Pareto improvement over the first mover simply ending the
story unwittingly or the EFGwittingly.
When the second movers in our narrative do not know that there is a possibility of a 50%
increase in payoff for the first mover playing down, they conduct themselves differently than when
the payoffs are laid out beforehand in the EFG. The first movers do not knowwhat payoffs lie ahead
if they decide not to sell right away, and when the second movers know that the first movers do not
know what lies ahead, the second movers are less inclined to reward the first movers with the ($18,
$30) contract when it becomes a possibility. In an EFG experiment, first movers play down because
they see that the second mover can increase her own payoff by 50%, for we do not presume that the
first mover wishes to lower her payoff by 50%. When the decision is passed to the second mover in
the narrative, however, the secondmovers know the first movers did not knowwhatmight come of it
and 21.2 percentage points fewer of them (67.1%–45.9%) feel no need to reward the first movers
with the ($18, $30) contract. They take the ($6, $42) contract instead. For 54.1% of the secondmov-
ers, the Rule of Beneficent Conduct does not appear to apply. This is, of course, complicated by the
story line that another company is particularly impressed with the second movers contribution to
the app design and is, therefore, willing to double the offer. In accepting Contract 1, “$6,000 for Tay-
lor and $42,000 for you” the Rule of Beneficent Conduct is broken, for now the first mover has less
than the initial $12,000.Howdo the corresponding 20 first movers respond to the ($6, $42) contract?
Is offering the ($6, $42) contract an action of a hurtful tendency?
If you think that 10 of the 20 first movers (50%) choose to sue resulting in the ($4, $4) outcome,
go to page 577.
If you think that 4 of the 20 first movers (20%) choose to sue resulting in the ($4, $4) outcome,
go to page 578.
Figure 9. (a) Narrative Results for First Two Decisions. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which
is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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The complete results for the game are displayed in Figure 10a.1. The sample of seven pairs in
Smith andWilson (2013) at the third node of the EFGwith punishment is too small to statistically
compare sample proportions, but one would hardly be meaningful considering that we observe
that 42.9% (3 of 7) of EFG first movers and 50% (10 of 20) of narrative first movers choose ($4,
$4). First movers at the last decision node know that the secondmovers did not know that punish-
ing via suing the second mover would be an option on receiving the contract for ($6, $42), and yet
the contract for ($6, $42) does not excite resentment for a greater percentage of first movers.
Hence, we find that first movers do not apply the Rule of Just Conduct any more than first movers
in the EFG.
The major impact of the narrative is that a greater proportion of first movers let the second
mover act and a smaller proportion of second movers apply the Rule of Beneficent Conduct. In
other words, our narrative, relative to an EFG with the same payoffs, nontrivially affects the con-
duct of our participants in two of three decision nodes when the precise consequences of their
actions are unknowable in advance.
Go to page 582 and either keep one finger on this page or remember that you have arrived there
via page 577.
Figure 10. (a.1) Narrative Results for All Decisions. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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The complete results for the game are displayed in Figure 10a.2. The sample of seven pairs in
Smith andWilson (2013) at the third node of the EFGwith punishment is too small to statistically
compare sample proportions. Smith andWilson (2013) find that 57% (4 of 7) of EFG first movers
choose ($6, $42), and we find that 80% (16 of 20) of narrative first movers choose ($6, $42). The
95% confidence interval (asymptotic) for the proportion of first movers who do not sue is (0.6247,
0.9753).5 First movers at the last decision node know that the second movers did not know that
punishing via suing the second mover would be an option on receiving the contract for ($6, $42),
and when the story presents the first movers with the option to punish, overwhelmingly they do
not. If anything, we find that an even smaller proportion of first movers apply the Rule of Just
Conduct in the narrative game than in the EFG. The proportion of pairs that end the story/game
at ($6, $42) doubles from 16% (4 out of 25) in the EFG to 33.3% (16 out of 48) in our narrative.
The major impact of the narrative is that a greater proportion of first movers let the second
mover act, a smaller proportion of second movers apply the Rule of Beneficent Conduct, and a
large proportion of pairs realize ($6, $42). In other words, our narrative, relative to an EFG with
the same payoffs, nontrivially affects the conduct of our participants when the precise consequen-
ces of their actions are unknowable in advance.
Go to page 582 and either keep one finger on this page or remember that you have arrived there
via page 578.
Figure 10. (a.2) Narrative Results for All Decisions. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
5 For the next 13 pairs in an EFG experiment (for a total of 20) that would reach the third decision node, how many first
movers will play right? For an over/under bet at 8.5, well take the under (9 1 4 5 13 and 13/20 5 .65 > .6247).
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Figure 9b summarizes the number of decisions through the first two nodes. While we observe
in Finding 1 that a greater proportion of first movers let the second mover take the next action
than in an EFG, a comparable proportion of second movers, 73.0%, choose ($18, $30). In EFG
experiments (Figure 2), 67.1% of second movers play right (49 out of 73). Using a two-sided two-
proportion z-test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z 5 0.6, p-value 5
0.5283). The net result of more second movers applying the Rule of Beneficent Conduct is that a
greater proportion of narrative pairs, 56.3% versus 33.3% (49 out of 147) in EFG pairs, achieve a
Pareto improvement over the first mover simply ending the story unwittingly or the EFG wittingly.
When the second movers in our narrative do not know that there is a possibility of a 50%
increase in the payoff for the first mover playing down, they conduct themselves just as they do
when the payoffs are laid out beforehand in the EFG. The first movers do not know what payoffs
lie ahead if they decide not to sell right away, andwhen the secondmovers know that the first mov-
ers do not know what lies ahead, the second movers still reward the first movers with the ($18,
$30) contract when it becomes a possibility. In an EFG experiment, first movers play down
because they see that the second mover can increase her own payoff by 50% and the second mov-
ers payoff by 250%, for we do not presume that the first mover plays down to lower her payoff by
50%. When the decision is passed to the second mover in the narrative, however, the second mov-
ers know the first movers did not know what might come of it and yet 73.0% of them reward the
first movers with the ($18, $30) contract. They do not take the ($6, $42) contract. The Rule of
Beneficent Conduct appears to apply for all but 27.0% of the second movers despite the complica-
tion in the story line that another company is particularly impressedwith the second movers con-
tribution to the app design and is, therefore, willing to double the offer. How do the corresponding
10 first movers respond to ($6, $42) contract? Is offering the ($6, $42) contract an action of a hurt-
ful tendency?
If you think that 5 of the 10 first movers (50%) choose to sue resulting in the ($4, $4) outcome,
go to page 580.
If you think that 2 of the 10 first movers (20%) choose to sue resulting in the ($4, $4) outcome,
go to page 581.
Figure 9. (b) Narrative Results for First Two Decisions. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which
is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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The complete results for the game are displayed in Figure 10b.1. The sample of seven pairs in
Smith andWilson (2013) at the third node of the EFGwith punishment is too small to statistically
compare sample proportions, but the comparison would hardly be meaningful considering that
we observe that 42.9% (3 of 7) of EFG first movers and 50% (5 of 10) of narrative first movers
choose ($4, $4). First movers at the last decision node know that the second movers did not know
that punishing/suing the second mover would be an option on receiving the contract for ($6, $42),
yet the contract for ($6, $42) does not excite resentment for a greater percentage of first movers.
Hence, we find that first movers do not apply the Rule of Just Conduct any more than first movers
in the EFG.
The major impact of the narrative is that a greater proportion of first movers let the second
mover act, a greater proportion of pairs achieve ($18, $30) as second movers apply the Rule of
Beneficent Conduct at the same rate, and the same proportion of first movers apply the Rule of
Just Conduct. In other words, apart from vagueness of the prospect of letting the second mover
make the next decision, the conduct of our participants is largely unaffected by our narrative, rela-
tive to an EFGwith the same payoffs.
Go to page 582 and either keep one finger on this page or remember that you have arrived there
via page 580.
Figure 10. (b.1) Narrative Results for All Decisions. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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The complete results for the game are displayed in Figure 10b.2. The sample of seven pairs in
Smith andWilson (2013) at the third node of the EFGwith punishment is too small to statistically
compare sample proportions. Smith andWilson (2013) find that 57% (4 of 7) of EFG first movers
choose ($6, $42), and we find that 80% (8 of 10) of narrative first movers choose ($6, $42). First
movers at the last decision node know that the second movers did not know that punishing/suing
the second mover would be an option on receiving the contract for ($6, $42), and when the story
presents the first movers with the option to punish, rather surprisingly the first movers do not. If
anything, we find that an even smaller proportion of first movers apply theRule of Just Conduct in
the narrative game than in the EFG. The proportion of total pairs that end the story/game at ($4,
$4) drops from 12% (3 out of 25) in the EFG to amere 4.2% (2 out of 48) in our narrative.
The major impact of the narrative is that a greater proportion of first movers let the second
mover act, a greater proportion of pairs achieve ($18, $30) when second movers apply the Rule of
Beneficent Conduct at the same rate, and a minute proportion of pairs realize the poor outcome
($4, $4). In other words, our narrative, relative to an EFG with the same payoffs, nontrivially
affects the conduct of our participantswhen the precise consequences of their actions are unknow-
able in advance.
Go to page 582 and either keep one finger on this page or remember that you have arrived there
via page 581.
Figure 10. (b.2) Narrative Results for All Decisions. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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5. A Second Narrative Experiment
To simultaneously test the robustness of our results and whether a slight modification to our
narrative alters the conduct of our participants, holding everything else constant, we replace just
three words with two new ones at the second decision node only. Using the same story for the first
decision node, we can assess the robustness of the decisions on the first page with another set of
participants. Figure 11 illustrates the small change to the story. Our aim is, ceteris paribus, to dif-
ferently draw the future into the desires expressed at the second decision node by crediting the first
movers efforts to the app as the reason for the doubled offer. We hypothesize that a greater pro-
portion of second movers will choose the contract for ($18, $30), applying the Rule of Beneficent
Conduct.
This treatment is central to the thesis of this article and should not be mistaken for a framing
effect that economists often summarily dismiss. A framing effect is a pattern of judgment whereby
people differently respond to different hypothetical situations that are logically equivalent.6 Our
change in the narrative is not a framing effect because the two narratives are not logically equiva-
lent. The payoffs are identical and the possible actions are identical, but the newly discovered pres-
ent as caused by the immediate past is decidedly not. The open research question is whether the
Rule of Beneficent Conduct at the second decision node differently draws the future into the expres-
sion of the present actions.
Procedures
Two months after the first experiment we recruited another 96 undergraduate participants,
46male and 50 female, for four equally sized sessions. None had previously participated in the first
Figure 11. Illustration of the Change in Narrative 2. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is
available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
6 See, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1981).
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narrative experiment. Similar to the first experiment, this was the first economic experiment for
17.7% of the participants. The median number of experiments of prior experience was 6. All other
procedureswere identical to the first experiment.
Results
In what follows, we compare the decisions across our two narratives. As a baseline, Figure 12
reports the results for the first decision node in our second narrative. We fail to reject the null
hypothesis of equal proportions (z5 0.8, p-value5 0.4424) for our two narratives.
Finding: Statistically the same proportion of first movers choose ($12, $12) in our second narrative
experiment as they do in the first.
If you came from page 577, go to page 584.
If you came from page 578, go to page 585.
If you came from page 580, go to page 586.
If you came from page 581, go to page 587.
Figure 12. Results for First Decision Node in Narrative 2. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,
which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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If you think that 28 of the 40 second movers (70.0%) choose the ($18, $30) contract in Narra-
tive 2, go to page 588.
If you think that 36 of the 40 second movers (90.0%) choose the ($18, $30) contract in Narra-
tive 2, go to page 592.
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If you think that 28 of the 40 second movers (70.0%) choose the ($18, $30) contract in Narra-
tive 2, go to page 589.
If you think that 36 of the 40 second movers (90.0%) choose the ($18, $30) contract in Narra-
tive 2, go to page 593.
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If you think that 28 of the 40 second movers (70.0%) choose the ($18, $30) contract in Narra-
tive 2, go to page 590.
If you think that 36 of the 40 second movers (90.0%) choose the ($18, $30) contract in Narra-
tive 2, go to page 594.
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If you think that 28 of the 40 second movers (70.0%) choose the ($18, $30) contract in Narra-
tive 2, go to page 591.
If you think that 36 of the 40 second movers (90.0%) choose the ($18, $30) contract in Narra-
tive 2, go to page 595.
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Figure 13a.1.i reports the results for all three decision nodes in our second experiment. The
small change in words has a large impact on the proportion of second movers who choose the
($18, $30) contract. In Narrative 1, only 45.9% of the secondmovers reward the beneficence of the
first mover. In Narrative 2, 70.0% of the second movers, that is, 24.1 percentage points more, reward
the first movers action of beneficent tendency. We reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z
5 2.1, p-value5 0.0162, one-tailed test). It clearly matters whose effort is responsible for doubling
of the joint value of the app.7
The consummate consequentialist might be tempted to conclude because this version of the
story restores the results of the observed proportion of second mover play in extensive form trust
game experiments (67.1%) that the motive of the second movers in EFG trust games is to reward
the first mover for her contribution to doubling the pie. That leap, which ignores the different epis-
temic conditions of the narrative and EFG games, cannot account for why 45.9% still choose the
($18, $30) contract in the first narrative. What our narrative experiments expose is the possibility
that two individuals in an EFG might disagree on who is “responsible” for the pie doubling (Wil-
son 2010). Is it the first mover or the secondmover? The silence of the tree is deafening.
In Narrative 1, 50% of the first movers at the third decision node do not punish the second
movers for choosing the ($6, $42) contract. We find that even though a smaller proportion of the
secondmovers choose the ($6, $42) contract, the same proportion (50%) punishes in Narrative 2.
Unlike the Narrative 1 treatment, Narrative 2 clearly establishes the groundwork for theRule
of Beneficent Conduct and the Rule of Just Conduct in the world of the story. When the first mov-
ers contribution to the design of the app is that which results in a doubling ofMobileSpaces offer,
the secondmover rewards the first movers action of a beneficent tendency when she chooses ($18,
$30) over ($6, $42). The gratitude toward the first mover results in the second mover choosing the
highest payoff presented for the first mover. A hurtful tendency would be evidenced by reducing
the first movers payoff when it is her contribution that resulted in more money. And such an
action as an approved object of resentment, Smith (1759) asserts, prompts punishment. The story,
in this case, evokes the Rule of Just Conduct 50% of the time when first movers punish the second
movers decision to take the contract for ($6, $42).
Go to page 596.
Figure 13. (a.1.i) Results for Narrative 2. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
7 It also indicates how closely the participants read the story. How many words were changed?
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Figure 13a.2.i reports the results for all three decision nodes in our second experiment. The
small change in words has a large impact on the proportion of second movers who choose the
($18, $30) contract. In Narrative 1, only 45.9% of the secondmovers reward the beneficence of the
first mover. In Narrative 2, 70.0% of the second movers, that is, 24.1 percentage points more, reward
the first movers action of beneficent tendency. We reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z
5 2.1, p-value5 0.0162, one-tailed test). It clearly matters whose effort is responsible for doubling
of the joint value of the app.8
The consummate consequentialist might be tempted to conclude because this version of the
story restores the results of the observed proportion of second mover play in extensive form trust
game experiments (67.1%) that the motive of the second movers in EFG trust games is to reward
the first mover for her contribution to doubling the pie. That leap, which ignores the different epis-
temic conditions of the narrative and EFG games, cannot account for why 45.9% still choose the
($18, $30) contract in the first narrative. What our narrative experiments expose is the possibility
that two individuals in an EFG might disagree on who is “responsible” for the pie doubling (Wil-
son 2010). Is it the first mover or the secondmover? The silence of the tree is deafening.
In Narrative 1, only 4 out of 20 (20%) first movers at the third decision node punish the sec-
ond movers for choosing the ($6, $42) contract.We find that when a smaller proportion of the sec-
ond movers choose the ($6, $42) contract: a greater proportion 6 out of 12 (50%) punish the
secondmover in Narrative 2.9 Unlike the Narrative 1 treatment, Narrative 2 clearly establishes the
groundwork for the Rule of Beneficent Conduct and the Rule of Just Conduct in the world of the
story. When the first movers contribution to the design of the app is that which results in a dou-
bling of MobileSpaces offer, the second mover rewards the first movers action of a beneficent
tendency when she chooses ($18, $30) over ($6, $42). The gratitude toward the first mover results
in the second mover choosing the highest payoff presented for the first mover. A hurtful tendency
would be evidenced by reducing the first movers payoff when it is her contribution that resulted in
more money. And such an action as an approved object of resentment, Smith (1759) asserts,
prompts punishment. The story, in this case, evokes the Rule of Just Conduct 50% of the time
when first movers punish the secondmovers decision to take the contract for ($6, $42).
Go to page 596.
Figure 13. (a.2.i) Results for Narrative 2. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
8 It also indicates how closely the participants read the story. How many words were changed?
9 At the 90% level of confidence, we reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z 5 1.8, p-value 5 0.0763, two-
tailed test).
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Figure 13b.1.i reports the results for all three decision nodes in our second experiment. The
small change in words has virtually no impact on the proportion of second movers who choose the
($18, $30) contract. In Narrative 1, 73.0% of the second movers reward the beneficence of the first
mover. In Narrative 2, 70.0% of the second movers reward the first movers action of beneficent
tendency. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z5 0.3, p-value5 0.8893, one-
tailed test). It matters rather little whose effort is responsible for doubling the joint value of the app.
In Narrative 1, 50% of the first movers at the third decision node do not punish the second
movers for choosing the ($6, $42) contract. We find the same proportion (50%) of first movers
punish in Narrative 2. From the perspective of an observer, the expression of theRule of Just Con-
duct is a consistent coin flip. In sum, apart from the first movers decision to let the second mover
act, there is no evidence of any difference between our narratives, nor between our narratives and
the traditional EFG experiment.10 Does this mean that narratives do not matter in trust games?
The answer depends on whether (i) you believe that payoffs are all that matter and that it matters
little that the future is unforeseeable or (ii) you simply conclude that this narrative does not matter
for this game.
Go to page 596.
Figure 13. (b.1.i) Results for Narrative 2. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
10 The critic who expected that the change in Narrative 2 wouldnt matter might claim that it indicates how inattentively
the participants read the story in both experiments. How many words were changed?
590 Osborn, Wilson, and Sherwood
Figure 13b.2.i reports the results for all three decision nodes in our second experiment. The
small change in words has virtually no impact on the proportion of secondmovers who choose the
($18, $30) contract. In Narrative 1, 73.0% of the secondmovers reward the beneficence of the first
mover. In Narrative 2, 70.0% of the second movers reward the first movers action of beneficent
tendency. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z 5 0.3, p-value 5 0.8893,
one-tailed test). It matters rather little whose effort is responsible for doubling the joint value of
the app.
In Narrative 1, only 2 out of 10 (20%) first movers at the third decision node punish the sec-
ond movers for choosing the ($6, $42) contract. We find that when the same proportion of the sec-
ond movers choose the ($6, $42) contract, a greater proportion 6 out of 12 (50%) punish the
secondmover in Narrative 2. Resentment appears to growwhen the first movers effort is responsi-
ble for increasing the joint value of the project, though because so many second movers choose the
($18, $30) contract our sample sizes at the third node are too small to appropriately conduct a z-
test of sample proportions. In sum, apart from the first movers decision to let the second mover
act, there is little evidence of any difference between our narratives, nor between our narratives
and the traditional EFG experiment.11 Does this mean that narratives do not matter in trust
games? The answer depends on whether (i) you believe that payoffs are all that matter and that it
matters little that the future is unforeseeable or (ii) you simply conclude that this narrative does
not matter for this game.
Go to page 596.
Figure 13. (b.2.i) Results for Narrative 2. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
11 The critic who expected that the change in Narrative 2 wouldnt matter might claim that it indicates how inattentively
the participants read the story in both experiments. How many words were changed?
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Figure 13a.1.ii reports the results for all three decision nodes in our second experiment. The
small change in words has a tremendously large impact on the proportion of second movers who
choose the ($18, $30) contract. InNarrative 1, only 45.9% of the secondmovers reward the benefi-
cence of the first mover. InNarrative 2, 90.0% of the secondmovers, that is, 44.1 percentage points
more, reward the first movers action of beneficent tendency.We reject the null hypothesis of equal
proportions (z 5 2.1, p-value 5 0.0162, one-tailed test). It matters dramatically whose effort is
responsible for doubling of the joint value of the app.12
Four previous extensive form trust game experiments each find that 2/3 of second movers
reward the beneficence of first movers. In Narrative 2, 90% of second movers apply the Rule of
Beneficent Conduct.13 Rare is the result in experimental economics in which 36 of 40 participants
make the same decision when such a result is ex ante uncertain. Moreover, 75% (36 out of 48) of
all pairs end up at the ($18, $30) outcome. How many pairs in extensive form trust games realize
the equivalent of the ($18, $30) outcome? Merely one-third (47 out of 147). Our second narrative
generates a conformity of welfare-improving conduct that EFGs do not and starkly suggests, in
comparison to the first narrative, that the higher variance of outcomes in EFG experiments stems
from a disagreement on who is “responsible” for the pie doubling (Wilson (2010)). Is it the first
mover or the secondmover? The silence of the tree is deafening.
In Narrative 1, 50% of the first movers at the third decision node do not punish the second
movers for choosing the ($6, $42) contract. The flip side of the stark result at the second decision
node is a dearth of data at the third node for Narrative 2. We find that even though only 4 second
movers choose the ($6, $42) contract, the same proportion (50%) punishes.
The Narrative 2 treatment clearly establishes the groundwork for the Rule of Beneficent
Conduct in the world of the story. When the first movers contribution to the design of the app is
that which results in a doubling of MobileSpaces offer, the second mover rewards the first mov-
ers action of a beneficent tendency when she chooses ($18, $30) over ($6, $42). The gratitude
toward the first mover results in the second mover choosing the highest payoff presented for the
first mover. A hurtful tendency would be evidenced by reducing the first movers payoff when it
is her contribution that resulted in more money. And such an action as an approved object of
resentment, Smith (1759) asserts, prompts punishment. The story, in this case, evokes the Rule of
Just Conduct 50% of the time when first movers punish the second movers decision to take the
contract for ($6, $42). Go to page 596.
Figure 13. (a.1.ii) Results for Narrative 2. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
12 It also indicates how closely the participants read the story. How many words were changed?
13 We reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z 5 2.7, p-value5 0.0071, two-tailed test).
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Figure 13a.2.ii reports the results for all three decision nodes in our second experiment. The
small change in words has a tremendous impact on the proportion of second movers who choose
the ($18, $30) contract. In Narrative 1, only 45.9% of the secondmovers reward the beneficence of
the first mover. In Narrative 2, 90.0% of the second movers, that is, 44.1 percentage points more,
reward the first movers action of beneficent tendency. We reject the null hypothesis of equal pro-
portions (z 5 2.1, p-value 5 0.0162, one-tailed test). It matters dramatically whose effort is
responsible for doubling the joint value of the app.14
Four previous extensive form trust game experiments each find that 2/3 of second movers
reward the beneficence of first movers. In Narrative 2, 90% of second movers apply the Rule of
Beneficent Conduct.15 Rare is the result in experimental economics in which 36 of 40 participants
make the same decision when such a result is ex ante uncertain. Moreover, 75% (36 out of 48) of
all pairs end up at the ($18, $30) outcome. How many pairs in extensive form trust games realize
the equivalent of the ($18, $30) outcome? Merely one-third (47 out of 147). Our second narrative
generates a conformity of welfare-improving conduct that EFGs do not and starkly suggests, in
comparison to the first narrative, that the higher variance of outcomes in EFG experiments stems
from a disagreement on who is “responsible” for the pie doubling (Wilson (2010)). Is it the first
mover or the secondmover? The silence of the tree is deafening.
In Narrative 1, only 4 out of 20 (20%) first movers at the third decision node punish the sec-
ond movers for choosing the ($6, $42) contract. The flip side of the stark result at the second deci-
sion node is a dearth of data at the third node for Narrative 2. We find that even though only 4
secondmovers choose the ($6, $42) contract, the 2 first movers (50%) punish.
The Narrative 2 treatment clearly establishes the groundwork for the Rule of Beneficent Con-
duct in the world of the story. When the first movers contribution to the design of the app is that
which results in a doubling of MobileSpaces offer, the second mover rewards the first movers
action of a beneficent tendency when she chooses ($18, $30) over ($6, $42). The gratitude toward
the first mover results in the second mover choosing the highest payoff presented for the first
mover. A hurtful tendency would be evidenced by reducing the first movers payoff when it is her
contribution that resulted in more money. And such an action as an approved object of resent-
ment, Smith (1759) asserts, prompts punishment. The story, in this case, evokes the Rule of Just
Conduct 50% of the time when first movers punish the second movers decision to take the con-
tract for ($6, $42). Go to page 596.
Figure 13. (a.2.ii) Results for Narrative 2. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
14 It also indicates how closely the participants read the story. How many words were changed?
15 We reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z 5 2.7, p-value 5 0.0071, two-tailed test).
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Figure 13b.1.ii reports the results for all three decision nodes in our second experiment. The
small change in words has a tremendously large impact on the proportion of second movers who
choose the ($18, $30) contract. In Narrative 1, 73.0% of the second movers reward the beneficence of
the firstmover. InNarrative 2, 90.0% of the secondmovers reward the first movers action of a beneficent
tendency. We reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z 5 1.9, p-value 5 0.0265, one-tailed
test). It clearlymatterswhose effort is responsible for doubling of the joint value of the app.16
Four previous extensive form trust game experiments each find that 2/3 of second movers
reward the beneficence of first movers. In Narrative 2, 90% of second movers apply the Rule of
Beneficent Conduct.17 Rare is the result in experimental economics in which 36 of 40 participants
make the same decision when such a result is ex ante uncertain. Moreover, 75% (36 out of 48) of
all pairs end up at the ($18, $30) outcome. How many pairs in extensive form trust games realize
the equivalent of the ($18, $30) outcome? Merely one-third (47 out of 147). Our second narrative
generates a conformity of welfare-improving conduct that EFGs do not and starkly suggests, in
comparison to the first narrative, that the higher variance of outcomes in two-person EFG experi-
ments stems from a disagreement on who is “responsible” for the pie doubling (Wilson (2010)). Is
it the first mover or the secondmover? The silence of the tree is deafening.
In Narrative 1, only 5 out of 10 (50%) first movers at the third decision node punish the sec-
ond movers for choosing the ($6, $42) contract. The flip side of the stark result at the second deci-
sion node is a dearth of data at the third node for Narrative 2. We find that only 4 second movers
choose the ($6, $42) contract, and 2 of them (50%) punish.
The Narrative 2 treatment clearly establishes the groundwork for the Rule of Beneficent Con-
duct in the world of the story. When the first movers contribution to the design of the app is that
which results in a doubling of MobileSpaces offer, the second mover rewards the first movers
action of a beneficent tendency when she chooses ($18, $30) over ($6, $42). The gratitude toward
the first mover results in the second mover choosing the highest payoff presented for the first
mover. A hurtful tendency would be evidenced by reducing the first movers payoff when it is her
contribution that resulted in more money. And such an action as an approved object of resent-
ment, Smith (1759) asserts, prompts punishment. The story, in this case, evokes the Rule of Just
Conduct 50% of the time when first movers punish the second movers decision to take the con-
tract for ($6, $42). Go to page 596.
Figure 13. (b.1.ii) Results for Narrative 2. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
16 It also indicates how closely the participants read the story. How many words were changed?
17 We reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z 5 2.7, p-value5 0.0071, two-tailed test).
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Figure 13b.2.ii reports the results for all three decision nodes in our second experiment. The
small change in words has a tremendously large impact on the proportion of second movers who
choose the ($18, $30) contract. In Narrative 1, 73.0% of the secondmovers reward the beneficence of
the first mover. In Narrative 2, 90.0% of the second movers reward the first movers action of a benefi-
cent tendency. We reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z 5 1.9, p-value 5 0.0265, one-
tailed test). It clearlymatterswhose effort is responsible for doubling of the joint value of the app.18
Four previous extensive form trust game experiments each find that 2/3 of second movers
reward the beneficence of first movers. In Narrative 2, 90% of second movers apply the Rule of
Beneficent Conduct.19 Rare is the result in experimental economics in which 36 of 40 participants
make the same decision when such a result is ex ante uncertain. Moreover, 75% (36 out of 48) of
all pairs end up at the ($18, $30) outcome. How many pairs in extensive form trust games realize
the equivalent of the ($18, $30) outcome? Merely one-third (47 out of 147). Our second narrative
generates a conformity of welfare-improving conduct that EFGs do not and starkly suggests, in
comparison to the first narrative, that the higher variance of outcomes in two-person EFG experi-
ments stems from a disagreement on who is “responsible” for the pie doubling (Wilson (2010)). Is
it the first mover or the secondmover? The silence of the tree is deafening.
In Narrative 1, only 2 out of 10 (20%) first movers at the third decision node punish the sec-
ond movers for choosing the ($6, $42) contract. The flip side of the stark result at the second deci-
sion node is a dearth of data at the third node for Narrative 2. We find that only 4 second movers
choose the ($6, $42) contract, and 2 of them (50%) punish.
The Narrative 2 treatment clearly establishes the groundwork for the Rule of Beneficent Con-
duct in the world of the story. When the first movers contribution to the design of the app is that
which results in a doubling of MobileSpaces offer, the second mover rewards the first movers
action of a beneficent tendency when she chooses ($18, $30) over ($6, $42). The gratitude toward
the first mover results in the second mover choosing the highest payoff presented for the first
mover. A hurtful tendency would be evidenced by reducing the first movers payoff when it is her
contribution that resulted in more money. And such an action as an approved object of resent-
ment, Smith (1759) asserts, prompts punishment. The story, in this case, evokes the Rule of Just
Conduct 50% of the time when first movers punish the second movers decision to take the con-
tract for ($6, $42). Go to page 596.
Figure 13. (b.2.ii) Results for Narrative 2. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
18 It also indicates how closely the participants read the story. How many words were changed?
19 We reject the null hypothesis of equal proportions (z 5 2.7, p-value 5 0.0071, two-tailed test).
Conduct in Narrativized Trust Games 595
If you are arriving to this page from p. 595, then you have correctly anticipated the actual nar-
rative of the results (via pp. 575, 579, 581–583, 587). Figure 14 summarizes the actual results for
the two narrative treatments. The summary implications of our findings for the two treatments are
discussed on pp. 581 and 595.
6. Conclusion
Life is indefinite and always in flux. As capable as humans are of kindness by advancing
mutual good, they are equally capable of effecting and ready in designing mischief. To contend
with the capriciousness of humans, rules of conduct arose in the small band or tribe, by experience
and tradition, to regularize and order human interaction (Hayek 1973, 1988). In the face of an
unknowable future, we rely on rules of conduct to guide us as the momentaneous present is
revealed. Human beings do not simply express behavior; that is, act under specified conditions like
amoral molecules in a flask. Rather, we conduct ourselves accordingly in relation to the circum-
stances in which we suddenly find ourselves. If by creating laboratory experiments our goal is to
understand human conduct against this hurly-burly background of human action, then including
that which is essentially human—the stories we tell ourselves to make meaning of our experi-
ence—is as much a part of economics as the science of pecuniary interests that currently pervades
the discipline.
Moreover, economic scientists no more set aside their humanness when contemplating the
conduct of experimental participants than the participants themselves do when they enter the lab-
oratory. The results do not speak in their own voice to the readers; the readers themselves make
meaning of the observations. Their own voices echo through the results. And that is the spirit in
which we present our results to the reader. An economic experiment is ultimately about testing
what we expect of it, our own way of interpreting the facts, our own assumptions about how we
think the narrative of the world works. Thus, each unexpected fact that we encounter is an
Figure 14. Actual Narrative Results. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at
wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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opportunity to work on our own way of seeing things. Discovery is irreversible, whether it is by a
participant in a laboratory experiment or by a reader of a laboratory experiment. A discovery
changes the story; it changes what a person knows. Theres no going back. But what doesnt
change is the rule of conduct applicable to the particular circumstances of time and place. Strict
logical performance in game theory, however, is reversible and thus antithetical for studying
moments of discovery and our human conduct therein. Rules of the conduct are our footholds on
the shores of unanticipated reality.
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